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Conclusion
The Contentious Terrain of North Korean Human Rights
Activism
Andrew Yeo and Danielle Chubb
The chapters collected in this volume provide insights into the ways activists in
various contexts have pursued the issue of North Korean human rights.
The stories that emerge reveal a contentious terrain, where relations between
activists and groups are defined by the different ideas they bring to the table, in
terms of how to bring about real change for the North Korean people.
The volume, therefore, brings the discursive frames that surround activists
and their networks into the spotlight. By identifying and unpacking the ideas –
as reflected in discourse – that drive activism, we shed light on the wide variety
of debates taking place within the civil society sphere and the larger transna-
tional advocacy network. Taken together, these expositions provide rare
insights into the long and often difficult path activists have trodden in their
quest to shed light on the human rights abuses taking place inside North
Korea, and to advocate for better outcomes. The complex interactions within
and between civil society and state actors in the North Korean human rights
network have shaped public conceptions of how North Korean human rights
are viewed today. We learn, crucially, about why certain rights conceptions
have becomemore dominant than others, as well as points of convergence and
divergence within debates over North Korean human rights.
In Chapter 1, we argued that activists’ interpretations of their normative
commitments, reflected in their discursive frames, carry consequences for
advocacy movements and their subsequent outcomes. In the case of North
Korean human rights, the outcomes pursued by activists are diverse and range
from bringing about human-rights-compliant behavior in the repressive state
to provoking regime change or collapse. As such, the chapters in this volume
explore the varieties of discursive frames that activists deploy and the relation-
ship between such discursive frames, transnational mobilization, and human
rights advocacy outcomes. This concluding chapter will offer some reflections
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on the themes that have emerged in this volume, articulate observations on the
value of empirically driven research into transnational activism, and consider
the implications of the volume’s findings for scholarship and policy.
ACTORS, IDEAS, AND STRATEGIES IN THE NORTH KOREAN HUMAN
RIGHTS SPHERE
The report from the UN COI on North Korean human rights puts the
responsibility for post-COI action squarely in the hands of the DPRK, as
well as a broad collection of outside actors including China, South Korea
(and the South Korean people), civil society, and the “international commu-
nity” as a whole. The recommendations put forward by the Commission’s
report are wide-ranging, including the referral of North Korean leadership to
the ICC, the fostering of inter-Korean dialogue, and the promotion of people-
to-people dialogue. Most poignantly, the COI report implored the UN
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to “ensure that the conclusions and
recommendations of the Commission do not pass from the active attention
of the international community. Where so much suffering has occurred and is
still occurring, action is the shared responsibility of the entire international
community.”1
Our project began with the simple proposition that if we wish to understand
the obstacles and opportunities facing the international community as it seeks
to act on the report’s various recommendations, we should first look at the
evolution of North Korean human rights discourse, at both the domestic and
transnational levels. The points of convergence and contention that have
characterized discourse and activism in these spaces are reflected in the
COI report, and a greater understanding of how state and nonstate actors
have navigated this terrain provides a distinct and comprehensive reading of
where the international community stands with respect to the North Korean
human rights issue.
Three major themes emerge from this volume. First, particular interpreta-
tions of human rights dominate the network’s agenda, thus reflecting the
values and motivations of the actors involved within it. Second, the chapters
reveal the important role that state-based actors have played within advocacy
networks across a variety of domestic and regional contexts. Finally, we find
that while a strong advocacy network clearly exists (corroborated by the similar
patterns and parallels revealed across the chapters), actors within the network
have proven themselves remarkably adaptive. The network is simultaneously
1 UN Human Rights Council 2014, sect. V.94(f).
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cohesive and fractured, and deliberately so. In the paragraphs that follow, we
briefly consider each of these themes in turn.
Defining the Discursive Terrain: The Politicization of North
Korean Human Rights
Human right advocates in this space have been engaged in long-running
conversations about the types of approaches needed to bring about human
rights change in North Korea, and which actors are best equipped to bring
about such change. Conversations taking place in South Korea, the United
States, Japan, and Europe, for example, take on their own distinctive discur-
sive and normative forms, which then feed into the transnational sphere.
At the same time, the evolving discursive terrain at the transnational level is
reflected back into domestic debates, with actors continually responding to the
changing shape of North Korean human rights discourse. A thematic focus of
many chapters in this volume has been the question of how actors understand
and interpret the North Korean human rights debate.
In South Korea, for example, debates over North Korean human rights have
been dominated by conservative voices, as illustrated by Reidhead in
Chapter 2. However, in part due to resistance from progressive South
Korean lawmakers who were reticent to take a public stand on the North
Korean human rights issue out of concern that it would jeopardize
inter-Korean engagement opportunities, South Korea’s National Assembly
could not pass its own domestic legislation on North Korean human rights.
This began to change with the establishment of the COI, which, alongside the
growing transnational movement supporting the COI’s findings, helped shift
the tenor of human rights discourse in South Korea. Where North Korean
human rights were once seen as an issue dominated by radical, anticommunist
conservatives, the COI and the international profile and legitimacy the
UNHRC provided pushed North Korean human rights into the South
Korean conservative mainstream. As Goedde notes in Chapter 7, the COI
report increased pressure on the South Korean government to pass a North
Korean human rights bill which had been stalled in the National Assembly for
more than a decade.
Although the COI report helped push North Korean human rights out of
the shadows and placed it on the agenda of the international community,
there is no doubt that debate on North Korean human rights – certainly,
debate that is audible to the political mainstream – is politicized, and often
framed through the lens of an isolationist, political-change paradigm.
In South Korea, arguments around economic, social, and cultural rights are
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often disconnected from the broader human rights debate and tend to form
part of a progressive, rather than conservative, agenda. The evolution of
discourse in the United States, while forming a longer trajectory (as explicated
by Yeo in Chapter 3) has also seen a great deal of interaction between
conservative political forces and the civil society sphere. In the US context,
discourse over North Korean human rights was shaped by Cold War–era
debates suffused with anticommunist ideology. The conservative paradigm
that tends to dominate discourse over North Korean human rights in both
South Korea and the US has thus evolved within a broader political context.
In Japan, too, discourse around North Korean human rights is linked inex-
tricably with a localized, political agenda. Arrington’s conceptualization of
North Korean human rights discourse as “multivalent” highlights the interac-
tion between the emotive abductions issue and the broader human rights
narrative that has taken root. In Japan, different networks and organizations
have come together and deployed distinctive conceptions of North Korean
human rights.
Shifting attention to Europe, Narayan in Chapter 5 suggests that the con-
versation on North Korean human rights appears more diversified. Narayan
points to the idea of “critical engagement” where human rights advocates have
worked with states to shape a foreign policy outlook which seeks to maintain
a constructive relationship with the North Korean government while at the
same time introducing human rights issues into the dialogue. Of course, draw-
ing North Korea into a dialogue about their own human rights situation is at the
core of a UN-focused strategy. As Hosaniak demonstrates in Chapter 6, transna-
tional coalitions have used diplomatic tools to introduce ideas of accountability
into North Korean human rights discourse and advocacy. In Europe and at the
UN, therefore, activists draw on ideas around dialogue and consultation, which
coalesces with the EU’s broader foreign policy framework.2 Here, discursive
frames employed by activists are less affected by local political ideologies than
they might be in South Korea, the United States, and Japan, and this has proven
to have direct consequences for strategies. Rather than seeking to isolate North
Korea, activists seek to engage, or to at least place pressure on, the regime within
the UN institutional framework.
Network Composition: The Role of the State
A second theme, and one closely connected to the above, is the important
activist role that state actors play within the broader network. Their role has
2 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 165–7.
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carried significant implications for the North Korean human rights move-
ment’s discursive and strategic evolution. Reidhead’s observations of the
trajectory of human rights discourse in South Korea leads him to the conclu-
sion that the human rights debate has been entirely co-opted by political
entities and linked to partisan ideas about how to induce change in North
Korea. Yeo similarly sees a significant role for the state in the US context,
arguing that state actors and discourse provided a preexisting discursive struc-
ture dating back to Cold War–era ideas around democracy promotion and
civil and political rights. In both these cases, the insertion of (neo)conservative
elements into the movement, while elevating the profile of the issue, also
closed off network membership to activists and organizations not willing to
associate themselves with what they saw as an increasingly politicized – and
political – right-wing agenda. There is nothing natural about the association of
the North Korean human rights issue with conservative ideology, and to
understand how this has come about, the role of state structures and agents
has proven to be important.
In Japan, the framing of the abductions issue as part of the broader story of
North Korean human rights has taken place with a high level of coordination
between state and nonstate actors. While a range of different categories of
activists have all worked to shape the discourse on North Korean human
rights, the strong involvement of the state in the abductions issue has influ-
enced the trajectory of the domestic movement. Arrington describes the
politics behind the signing of the 2006 North Korean Abductions and
Human Rights Act, which consolidated the abductions issue as part of
a broader human rights narrative. In Europe, while the issues at stake are
very different from the Japanese context, here too activists work within a sphere
that is already dominated by state institutions. EU dialogue with the DPRK
tends to dominate the framework around which activism is formed in the EU.
Here, the narrative is considerably less politicized than it is in Japan, South
Korea, and the United States –most likely, as Narayan observes, because of the
physical separation of the EU from the Northeast Asian region and its geopo-
litics. European nonstate actors, as noted earlier, thus work within a formal
institutional template that has allowed direct interaction between state actors
and the DPRK. We further explore the policy implications of this state-
nonstate actor interaction in the final section of this chapter.
Fractured but Effective: The Benefits of Adaptive Activism
Finally, at the center of all these political debates lies the core question of
which strategies will work best to draw North Korea into the fold of human
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rights-respecting states. We argued in Chapter 1 that current models of human
rights change, which revolve around transnational engagement with domestic
actors, must be expanded to take into account mechanisms for change applied
by actors within the North Korean human rights movement. As Baek
(Chapter 11) discusses in detail, some activists have turned their attention to
strategies directly targeted at North Korean citizens. We label this approach
“subversive” for its tendency to bypass state structures altogether and breach
the North Korean government’s information blockade.
At the heart of this subversive action is the motivating belief that change is
impossible within the current political context and that the only way forward is
to challenge the legitimacy of the North Korean regime by activating the
consciousness of the North Korean people. Distinct from actors applying these
sorts of direct mechanisms for change are activists that choose to work through
the more well-worn pathways of state-centered diplomacy. As Goedde illus-
trates in Chapter 7, without local partners able to bring about change “from
below,” some activists have focused their attention on bringing change from
“above.” To do this, they must bring the state into the conversation, and it is in
this context that legal mechanisms have become a key tool for activists. This
approach differs substantially from that of activists promoting subversive
change. Not only do these network actors work within the state-centric UN
framework, their reliance on transnational legal mechanisms produces a top-
down style of advocacy, contrasted with the bottom-up focus of those groups
trying to plant the seeds of a grassroots movement.
As Goedde (Chapter 7), Chubb (Chapter 8), and Fahy (Chapter 10) all
note, these twin approaches to the issue of North Korean human rights –
pursuing change through top-down legal mechanisms and bottom-up infor-
mation campaigns coupled with disruptive sanctions tactics – have worked to
the advantage of the network. Actors have proven themselves adaptive insofar
as they have leveraged off the success of each other. Actors advocating direct
action actively participated in the COI information collection and cite the
report as evidence of the legitimacy of their broader claims for change.
Actors that prefer to work within UN structures have benefited directly
from the profile of the dominant voices of the campaign – most of which
align with the “direct action” side of the movement – in terms of raising
awareness on North Korean human rights among the broader international
community.
The North Korean human rights movement has also been notable for
the role defector voices have played in providing important evidentiary
weight to the movement’s core claims. The very use of the term “defectors”
is a political act, and one adopted deliberately by the self-styled
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“defector-activists.”3 Song, in Chapter 9, notes that defector narratives are
shaped by a range of factors related to experiences following defection,
which in turn shape the individual identities of defectors. There is no
doubt, she argues, that the transnational agenda has conversely been shaped
by the identity formation of these defectors, which coexists in a complex
environment with human rights narratives. Without these defector voices –
as complicated and at times controversial as they might be – the North
Korean human rights movement would look very different today.
The evidence-based research undertaken by our contributors has provided
a rich and varied understanding of how the North Korean human rights
activist movement operates, the intranetwork dynamics at play, and the types
of strategies adopted by actors in various parts of themovement. Their research
provides nuance and depth to scholarly work that has previously approached
the issue of North Korean human rights activism and policy from a normative
perspective. This latter body of work tends to draw direct links between the
motivations of actors interested in security issues on the Korean peninsula, and
the human rights agenda of such actors. As we discuss in the next section,
while the security–human rights linkage is certainly an important part of this
story, it falls short in providing a comprehensive understanding of the actors
and issues at play.
HEGEMONY, IMPERIALISM, AND SCHOLARLY DEBATES ON
NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS
In our preface, and in Chubb’s contribution in Chapter 8, we acknowledged
a two-part special issue onNorth Korean human rights in the journalCritical
Asian Studies (CAS), guest edited by Christine Hong andHazel Smith.4This
special issue is perhaps one of the first major academic projects devoted to
the topic of North Korean human rights published in English, and certainly
one of the first to challenge the dominant framing of North Korean human
rights.5 On the one hand, the CAS special issue provides a useful corrective
to the overwhelming focus on political rights (that is: torture, political
prisons, arbitrary arrest, execution, and so on) by including articles which
3 As Hosaniak notes, this term does not belong to official UN terminology, where North Koreans
testifying about human rights abuses are more commonly referred to as victims.
4 Hong 2013. While Hong is the sole author of the introductory article, the journal lists both
Hong and Smith as guest editors.
5 Other scholars have written about North Korean human rights, including critical perspectives,
but usually as part of a larger study on North Korean politics and society or as a shorter stand-
alone piece. Lankov 2013; Moon 2008; Smith 2014; Feffer 2004.
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address the right to health,6 human security,7 and humanitarian and devel-
opment assistance.8 On the other hand, we believe that the effort in the
special issue’s framing introductory chapter to link the North Korean human
rights movement to a wider imperialist agenda9 misconstrues the more
complex dynamics of the advocacy network and the different domestic and
transnational contexts in which North Korean human rights discourse has
emerged. Because Hong’s focus on narrative resonates with our own exam-
ination of human rights discourse (and also because it precedes our work),
we find it useful to engage with this perspective and advance what we believe
to be a more balanced and comprehensive understanding of North Korean
human rights activism.
In the CAS special issue’s introductory article, Hong seeks to expose the
imperialist regime-change agenda underpinning the North Korean human
rights enterprise. As Hong argues, the dominant framing of NKHR is “rela-
tively presentist in its assignment of blame and politically harnessed to
a regime-change agenda.”10 Hong continues that this agenda allows the
human rights advocate to “assume a moralizing, implicitly violent posture
towards a ‘regime’ commonsensically understood to be ‘evil,’” and thus to
militarize the human rights agenda.11 Our research, to some degree, corrobo-
rates the findings and claims made in the CAS special issue. Reidhead’s
analysis of the shift in human rights discourse in South Korea from
a humanitarian framing to one of political rights is consistent with arguments
made by several contributors to the CAS special issue.12 Yeo’s study on the
significant role state actors play in shaping human rights discourse in
US foreign policy, and the alignment between security and human rights in
the framing of North Korea within US policy and activist communities, also
supports what Smith identifies as “the unconscious adoption of a securitized
perspective through which knowledge about North Korea is filtered.”13
Despite these commonalities, however, we respectfully disagree with Hong’s
depiction of the North Korean human rights advocacy movement, and the
heavy emphasis on US hegemony as the key culprit driving North Korean
human rights discourse and advocacy.
Earlier, Chubb noted that Hong failed to take into account the diversity of
actors working on North Korean human rights and the complexity of the
strategies deployed within the broader network. Here, it is worth recalling in
full Hong’s characterization of the North Korean human rights movement:
6 Shin and Choi 2013. 7 Liem 2014. 8 Bae and Moon 2014; Moon 2014.
9 Hong 2013. 10 Hong 2013, 511. 11 Hong 2013, 511, 516.
12 Moon 2014. See also Bae and Moon 2014 in the same issue. 13 Smith 2014, 127.
Conclusion 279
The North Korean human rights project . . . has allowed a spectrum of
political actors – US soft-power institutions, thinly renovated Cold War
defense organizations, hawks of both neoconservative and liberal varieties,
conservative evangelicals, anticommunist Koreans in South Korea and the
diaspora, and North Korean defectors – to join together in common cause . . .
The past decade has been witness to the consolidation of a US funded
transnational advocacy, propaganda and intelligence network under the
elastic banner of North Korean human rights.14
We concur with Hong that many of the voices speaking on the North Korean
human rights issue engage in a binary representation of tyranny and freedom,
and that these voices are often the loudest and may even constitute the public
face of the movement. Such findings were supported by several of our con-
tributors and corroborated by the hyperlink analysis of NGOs provided in
Chapter 8. However, neoconservative and liberal hawks, evangelicals, and
anticommunist South Koreans who might represent the hardline faction of
the transnational movement do not constitute the totality of human rights
activism. Nor do such binary categorizations underpin the language of the UN
COI report, which we take as our standard for evaluating North Korean
human rights discourse. Hong’s assertion that human rights “advocates figure,
in the framework of North Korean human rights, as beneficiaries of future
violence”15 derives from what we see to be at best an incomplete understand-
ing of the network’s discourse, goals, strategies, and ideas. As we argued in this
volume, activists are in fact nimble and demonstrate a remarkable ability to
negotiate a contested normative frame.
The brand of North Korean human rights advocacy articulated in the
CAS introductory piece (which is certainly not reflective of all the articles
in the special issue) is in part due to what we see as a selective reading of
North Korean human rights. The dominant human rights framing Hong
portrays resembles arguments most prevalent in the United States in the
early 2000s, when regime change rhetoric resonated with several leading
voices within US-based advocacy networks. Yet, this framing is not indica-
tive of the broader discussion on North Korean human rights which has, in
the years since, taken place elsewhere – in Europe or in Japan, or at the UN
or EU.
If at one point the dominant narrative of North Korean human rights
revolved around regime change, today this is no longer the case, or at least it
exists in conjunction with other narratives (that is, the accountability
narrative). Our inquiry into the evolution of North Korean human rights
14 Hong 2013, 511, 518. 15 Hong 2013, 522.
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discourse, and its relationship to the rise of a transnational advocacy move-
ment, therefore assumes a more fluid understanding of narrative (and, by
extension, discourse). Narratives and discourse are not static, despite the
(re)production and recycling of evidence generated by North Korean defec-
tor testimonies, NGO reports, official government statements, and news
media accounts.16 Even when such discourses are embedded in deep-seated
historical, institutional, and geopolitical structures, as Hong and Smith
suggest, actors carry the potential to shift existing narratives as they interact
with others. This is particularly true as new actors join the transnational
advocacy fold. Issues of credibility notwithstanding,17 North Korean defec-
tor-activists have given the transnational advocacy network a new voice
since the early 2000s. A selection of NGOs, including some funded by the
National Endowment for Democracy, do continue to talk about regime
change. But many others do not, instead focusing their energies on social
and economic issues, regime accountability, and the application of inter-
national law to prod the North Korean regime to comply with international
norms and laws.
FROM SCHOLARLY DEBATES TO POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Putting aside important theoretical aims and scholarly debates, this project
was foremost intended to provide activists, policymakers, students, and scho-
lars a better understanding of the evolution of North Korean human rights
advocacy. Much of this chapter has recapped various scholarly debates, ran-
ging from new insights on transnational advocacy networks drawn from the
case of North Korean human rights to a critique of critical perspectives on
North Korea and the need for presenting evidence and facts from different
points of view. Moving forward, the research and findings from this volume
offer guidance and recommended courses of action for policymakers and
activists.
16 Statements made by heads of government, key policymakers (including special representatives
assigned to address North Korean human rights policy such as South Korea’s Minister of
Unification or the US State Department’s Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights)
and parliamentary leaders present an “official” discourse on North Korean human rights.
As an analysis of the US State Department’s annual human rights report on North Korea
indicates, this language is often derived from reports produced by NGOs. Much of the
knowledge on North Korean human rights flows in a circular direction with NGOs and
government agencies citing the other’s work, reifying an “official” narrative of NKHR.
17 The case of Shin Donghyuk, who fabricated parts of his story which was then published by
Washington Post reporter Blaine Harden, is often cited here. See Chapter 9 in this volume by
Song, and also Song 2015.
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Developing the Two-Pronged Strategy
We identified two different mechanisms for change in North Korean human
rights: A legal/institutional approach which uses international law, sanc-
tions, diplomacy, and other political measures to pressure and persuade
the regime to comply with international human rights standards; and
a more subversive, “hands-on” approach which attempts to work directly
on the ground in North Korea by sending information into the country, or
aiding defectors/refugees out of the country (and out of China, where they
carry no legal standing).
Our research has shown that the two approaches have in fact complemen-
ted each other and should continue to be cultivated by state and nonstate
actors in tandem. Critics may argue that a two-pronged approach sends
mixed signals to North Korea. For instance, is the human rights advocacy
network, and the international community more broadly, prodding the
regime to adopt reforms to eventually enter the fold of international society?
Or, on the contrary, does the advocacy network seek to undermine the
regime, orchestrating its eventual demise? Human rights advocates, whether
policymakers or grassroots activists, will remain divided on this point.
However, given the slow and often nonlinear pace of human rights change,
for the time being, both approaches, as top-down and bottom-up strategies,
can be implemented without necessarily undermining the other’s long-term
goal. If the regime begins to implement serious rights reforms – for instance,
adopting domestic measures to improve the political and economic well-
being of its citizens – then it may behoove activists to curtail more subversive
tactics to encourage the regime to move ahead with political reforms.
Information warfare may, in fact, be less relevant at this stage if the regime
relaxes barriers to information. Conversely, if the North Korean regime
remains unwilling to address gross human rights violations, despite legal
repercussions, then a continuation or upward dialing of the information
campaign and other “bottom up” approaches to bring about change at the
individual and societal levels becomes warranted.
Adapting Human Rights Language to Account for the North
Korean Context
Despite the North Korean regime being a signatory to the relevant UN
conventions, our research shows that when engaging with North Korean
officials, the language of human rights has an inflammatory effect, often
shutting down dialogue precisely when it is most important to open channels
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of communication. UN and other state-level policy officials may find it helpful
to be mindful of this point, and to make efforts to adjust the discourse adopted
in conversations with North Korean officials. This is not to say that human
rights standards should be compromised, or even that the language of human
rights should be jettisoned. Rather, as Goedde articulates at length, human
rights are more likely to be diffused when they resonate with local norms and
understandings.
This recommendation around localization and contextualization has
implications for the two-pronged strategy described above. Information
campaigns are more likely to be successful if they are able to adapt to the
cultural context of the target population. This has certainly been the experi-
ence of North Korean defector radio stations. When radio broadcasts feature
former North Koreans who are able to communicate in the appropriate
vernacular and adopt a familiar style and cadence of talking via the medium
of radio, they are more likely to resonate with local audiences. Likewise,
information packets that frame human rights issues in relatable terms, or
even draw directly on North Korea’s own laws and regulations to highlight
the rights already available to disenfranchised communities, are more likely
to resonate with those populations that are at highest risk in terms of human
rights protection.
Adding a Third-Pronged Engagement Strategy
The localization of human rights language also has relevance when consider-
ing the adoption of a more expansive interpretation of human rights. North
Korea may be more responsive to the pursuit of rights objectives if it is
addressed more fulsomely through a more diverse set of discourses. Several
of our contributors took note of the marginalization of economic and social
issues in North Korean human rights advocacy; discourse on North Korea has
evolved in such a way that humanitarian concerns are often seen as distinct
from human rights objectives. Moreover, groups and actors focused on meet-
ing the humanitarian needs of North Koreans are often associated with the
“engagement” camp, whose mission, to some human rights activists, is per-
ceived as antithetical to the human rights agenda.18 The gap between the
human rights and the humanitarian assistance communities is also reinforced
by discourse from within the engagement camp; some remain hostile to the
human rights approach, assuming that its intent is to destroy rather than build
up the North Korean state.
18 Yeo 2014.
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Important professional and logistical boundaries certainly exist which jus-
tify treating humanitarian assistance as distinct from human rights. In parti-
cular, the delivery of food aid or medical supplies requires some degree of
access into North Korea and interaction with North Korean counterparts.
Denouncing the regime for human rights abuses would not endear UN or
NGO workers to DPRK officials, making it difficult (if not dangerous) for
them to conduct humanitarian or development operations. This is a trade-off
that is familiar to the humanitarian community, where actors continually seek
to strike a balance that is compliant and ethical.19
The gap between human rights and humanitarian/development assistance
communities has narrowed in recent years, in no small part due to the COI’s
explicit mention of “the right to food and related aspects of the right to life.”20
However, more work needs to be done to remind policymakers and the public
that meeting the economic needs of North Koreans, even via people-to-people
engagement initiatives, is equally valid and important in the fight for human
rights as outlined in the COI.
Roberta Cohen, co-chair emeritus of the Committee for Human Rights in
North Korea (HRNK), has presented one of the strongest cases for linking
human rights and humanitarian approaches within a comprehensive human
rights framework. For instance, she recommends that the UN apply its
“Human Rights Up Front” (HRuF) framework to North Korea. As an initiative
from the UN Secretary-General, HRuF calls on the UN to take measures
which would elevate human rights across the entire UN system, including
organizations and agencies which address problems related to development,
peace, and security.21 HRuF’s application to the DPRK would mean that UN
organizations, particularly humanitarian and development agencies working
inside North Korea, would “agree to take steps tomonitor and promote human
rights.”22The HRuF approach has also been endorsed by the COI and the UN
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the DPRK.23 As Cohen argues, by
making reference to human rights in the UN’s Strategic Framework for the
DPRK, “humanitarian organizations would then have an entry point for
19 See, for example, Schloms 2003.
20 UNHuman Rights Council 2014, 10; 16. The COI report stated that the DPRKmust “[e]nsure
that citizens can enjoy the right to food and other economic and social rights without
discrimination . . . promote agricultural, economic and financial policies based on demo-
cratic participation, good governance and non-discrimination; and legalize and support free
market activities, internal and external trade and other independent economic conduct that
provide citizens with a livelihood.”
21 For more onHRuF see the UN Secretary General webpage: www.un.org/sg/en/content/ban-ki
-moon/human-rights-front-initiative.
22 Cohen 2015, 16. 23 UN General Assembly 2014, para. 24.
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raising with North Korean authorities the human rights principles the DPRK
itself accepted at the UN’s Universal Periodic Review in 2014.”24 These
principles might include nondiscrimination in food distribution, access to
the most vulnerable population, and gender equality.25 Other recommenda-
tions pairing political/civil with economic/social rights include granting
access to healthcare in political prisons. In practice, this couldmean providing
aid workers access to administer tuberculosis vaccinations within the prison
population.
Policy shifts as described above can help bridge the human rights and
humanitarian divide. However, activists themselves must also begin to
frame, or at least acknowledge, humanitarian engagement as a legitimate
means of addressing human rights, including the right to food, shelter, and
employment. While humanitarian groups may resist such linkages, in our
discussions with NGOworkers, we find that it is possible to build greenhouses,
administer medication, or deliver food aid while still remaining fully cogni-
zant of potential human rights abuses and quietly raising such concerns when
opportune or warranted.26 For the hardline human rights activists who remain
critical of any form of engagement with North Koreans, two points are worth
considering. First, if the goal of human rights is to free the oppressed from
bondage (whether political or economic in nature, as the two are closely
linked) and improve the lives of ordinary people, then many humanitarian
and development engagement initiatives help achieve that goal, albeit on
a small, localized scale.
Second, if bringing information about the outside world to North Koreans is
a goal of human rights groups, then direct interaction between North Koreans
and foreigners, particularly those from North America and Europe, may
function as another channel of information. Americans involved in develop-
ment, humanitarian, and/or business ventures in North Korea have commen-
ted on how their interactions with North Koreans have helped dispel existing
myths about the “evil, ruthless American” which North Koreans are taught to
believe the moment they begin school. Aside from perhaps defector surveys or
anecdotal evidence, there is no way to measure if North Korean attitudes
toward foreigners and foreign countries meaningfully shift (and if such shifts
actually persist) over time as they repeatedly interact with the same foreign
individuals for several years. But, if radio broadcasts are sufficient in prompt-
ing some North Koreans to question their government (or at least the message
24 Cohen 2015, 16. 25 Cohen 2015, 16.
26 Yeo is a member of the National Committee on North Korea whose membership includes
many individuals pursuing engagement-oriented operations in North Korea. See Yeo 2017.
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their government has been sending them), it would not be unreasonable to
argue that people-to-people engagement might leave a positive, lasting impact
on North Koreans’ attitudes toward the outside world (and perhaps conversely
a negative view of their own leadership).27 In short, engagement strategies
should not be shunned, but instead embraced by the advocacy network.
Exercising Caution to Avoid Conflating Human Rights
with the Security Narrative
At the time of writing (late 2017), the security situation on the Korean penin-
sula has shifted from bad to worse. North Korea not only tested its first
intercontinental ballistic missile with the potential range to hit major
US cities, it also conducted its sixth nuclear test in September 2017. In the
meantime, Washington and Pyongyang have been caught in a precarious
spiral of escalatory rhetoric as each North Korean missile and nuclear test is
met with additional calls for tighter sanctions against North Korea and isola-
tion of the regime, and, by extension, the North Korean people.
Unfortunately, the attention on the nuclear problem has once again cast
a shadow over human rights issues.
As argued in our volume, a dominant narrative of North Korean human
rights, particularly in the United States, is one which securitizes the human
rights issue. From a strategic messaging standpoint, it makes perfect sense for
human rights advocates to frame (or “frame align,” in academic parlance) their
issue as a broader security problem.28 First, North Korea’s nuclear program and
its abuse of human rights are linked, however loosely, in that both actions are
a manifestation of the regime’s totalitarian nature. The regime maintains its
legitimacy in part by creating a highly militarized state, justified by a narrative of
the constant threat of war from the United States. The development of nuclear
weapons feeds into this narrative, with resources for the military prioritized over
the rest of the population. At the same time, the regime demands complete
loyalty and authority to the Kim family, restricting freedoms and civil liberties to
perpetuate both internal and external security. In short, if human rights and
security are two sides of the same coin, then one can easily frame human rights
as a security problem, and vice versa.
Second, most governments see North Korea as primarily a security problem.
As such, human rights activists can leverage ongoing nuclear concerns to draw
27 See Kretchun and Kim 2012 for data on foreign media exposure and North Korea’s positive
impression of the outside world.
28 “Security” here refers to international (or traditional) security rather than human security.
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greater attention to the “evil” nature of the regime and its horrific abuses.29
The first George W. Bush administration (2000–4) effectively portrayed North
Korea in such terms: not only is North Korea a nuclear proliferator, but it has
the audacity to starve the masses and throw its people into the gulags.30
Conversely, human rights advocates remind those in the national security
establishment that human rights (and related sanctions) serve as an additional
pressure point to bend the regime toward compliance with international
norms. The role played by human rights activist and blogger Joshua Stanton
in the drafting of the 2016 North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement
Act31 – which followed North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and places sanctions
on North Korean entities found to be, among other things, engaging in
proliferation activities or complicit in human rights abuses – is one example
of how this interaction has taken form in Washington DC.32 In this way, the
security community has used human rights as an additional point to justify
isolation and sanctions against North Korea. It is no secret that the issue of
North Korean human rights has attracted significant policy attention in part
because of North Korea’s status as a nuclear proliferating state.
There may be merit in linking human rights with security issues.33 However,
we recommend that human rights advocates in the policy and activist commu-
nities exercise caution in pushing the human rights–security nexus too far. One
past consequence (particularly in the early 2000s) of the security–human rights
nexus framing, as noted earlier, has been the dominance of conservative voices
calling for regime change. While regime change may very well have been (and
still remains) the end goal of some activists in the network, the association
betweenNorth Korean human rights and regime change has had the unintended
consequence of stigmatizing the issue as a conservative agenda. Although orga-
nizations dedicated to North Korean human rights, such as HRNK, have always
approached the issue as a nonpartisan one, in practice activists from the political
left, particularly in South Korea and the United States, remained peripheral in
the advocacy network. This subsequently sidelined engagement voices early in
the human rights movement – voices which should have been viewed as
complementary to the larger objective of bringing human rights change.
In turn, all forms of engagement, including people-to-people exchanges, were
conflated with nuclear and diplomatic engagement.
29 Conversely, the security community has used human rights as an additional point to justify
isolation and sanctions against North Korea.
30 Bush 2011, 422–3.
31 North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, H.R. 757, 114th Congress.
32 Joshua Stanton runs the blog One Free Korea. See freekorea.us.
33 See Cha and Gallucci 2016.
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Many in the human rights and humanitarian engagement camp today
recognize the important work of other groups in facilitating change in North
Korea, even if engagement groups still remain somewhat peripheral in the
overarching North Korean human rights advocacy network. Nevertheless, the
rapid advancement of North Korean nuclear and missile technology, and
the dramatic escalation of tensions between the United States and North
Korea, make it tempting to once again tag human rights onto security issues
to prevent human rights from being completely subsumed by the nuclear
problem.We do not deny the linkages between security and human rights, and
to some extent they should be addressed in tandem. However, the interna-
tional community now recognizes North Korean human rights as a grave
issue, and the need to advance human rights in the DPRK can and should
be articulated as an important issue in and of itself.
CONCLUSION
We simultaneously know so much and so little about North Korea. For two
decades, human rights activists have collected, documented, and analyzed all
available information to provide a persuasive outline of the restrictions and
abuses experienced by everyday North Koreans. At the same time, we also
know that ordinary North Koreans go about living their lives, experiencing
human drama, tragedy, love, loss, and fulfillment as others do everywhere else
in the world.34
Yet, despite all these insights, the humanity of North Koreans is often
forgotten. When world leaders raise the possibility of military options against
North Korea, where are the voices advocating the plight of the North Korean
people? They are either missing or marginalized as the security of the Korean
peninsula tends to be framed in military and not human terms.35 It is in this
context that the work of North Korean human rights activists takes on its
highest importance. The chapters in this volume provide empirically
grounded, contemporary accounts of the debates, ideas, strategies, successes,
and failures of the North Korean human rights movement. We have tried to
make sense of the wide array of actors working on this issue, by examining their
discourses and interrogating the nature of their relationships. Like all activist
arenas, the North Korean human rights movement is one where a range of
actors – none of them particularly powerful – vie for recognition, funding, and
influence. It is an imperfect human rights space, and one fromwhich everyday
North Korean citizens are absent, with advocates all claiming to best represent
34 Demick 2012. 35 Smith 2005.
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them. Yet as imperfect as this space is, it is the only place where the plight of
the local North Korean people is given any serious consideration at all. For
these reasons, an understanding of the evolution of North Korean human
rights advocacy and discourse will continue to remain relevant as we and the
international community anticipate the day the North Korean people are able
to realize the promise of human rights and determine their own future.
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